proper; and technical conditions are given below. With flat priors, inconsistency is the rule, even under our regularity conditions.
In previous papers (Diaconis and Freedman 1993; 1995) , we looked at nonparametric binary regression. There, natural priors were generally seen to give consistent estimates; but, under some circumstances, the estimates were inconsistent. This seemed quite mysterious, at least to us. We now have a heuristic understanding of the basic reason for inconsistencyto be explained below -and the present paper is a first test of that heuristic. The following paragraphs explain the background in more detail, and the heuristic. We also give a brief literature review on nonparametric Bayesian regression and consistency theorems.
Binary regression
First we summarize results from Diaconis and Freedman (1993; 1995) . There is a binary response variable K which is related to a covariate 6:
The problem is to estimate f from the data.
Following de Finetti (1959; , we think of 6 as a sequence of 0s and 1s. Sequence space is given the usual product topology, and the parameter space O is the set of measurable functions f from sequence space to [0, 11. The L2 topology is installed on O, relative to coin-tossing measure 1 in sequence space. A basic neighbourhood o f f E O is We will consider a prior n on O, with posterior 5,.Then JL is consistent at f provided ?,{Nu, e)} -, 1 almost surely, for all positive E . The next step is to define the hierarchical priors on O. Begin with a prior n k supported on the class of hnctions f that depend only on the first k coordinates, or bits, in 6.Under no, the function f does not depend on 6 at all. Under XI, f depends only on 6,. And so forth. Then treat k as an unknown 'hyperparameter', putting prior weight wk on k. We refer to k as the theory index; theory k says that f(x) depends only the first k bits of x; and wk is a theory weight. Our prior is of the form where X wr > 0 for all k and wk < m.
(1.3b) k=O To complete the description of the prior, x k must be specified. According to x k , only the first k bits in 6 matter, so f depends only on 61,. . . , (k. Thus, nk is determined by specifying the joint distribution of the 2k possible values for f: More crudely, j t k involves 2k free parameters -the possible values o f f on its intervals of constancy. For now, we take these parameters to be independent and uniformly distributed over [0, 11. We turn now to the data. For technical reasons, it is simplest to consider 'balanced' data, as in Diaconis and Freedman (1993) ; more conventional sampling plans are discussed in Diaconis and Freedman (1995) . At stage n, there are 2" subjects. Each has a covariate sequence; the first n bits of these covariate sequences cover all possible patterns of length n; each pattern appears once and only once. The remaining bits from n + 1 onwards are generated by coin tossing. Given the covariates, response variables are generated from (1 .I); the response of subject i depends only on the covariates for that subject. The preliminaries are now finished, and we can state a theorem. (The present paper will make the extension from binary data to normal data in Section 2.) Theorem
With nonparametric binary regression, balanced data, and a hierarchical uniform prior:
(a) n is consistent at f unless f =: i; (b) Suppose f =. i. Then n is consistent at f provided that for some 6 > 0, for all sufjciently large n, On the other harrd, n is inconsistent at f provided that for some 6 > 0,for injinitely many n, The surprising part of this theorem is the inconsistency result in (b) . Suppose the data are generated by tossing a fair coin, so f -i . Theory 0 is true: f does not depend on 6 at all.
You do not know that, and allow theories of finite but arbitrary complexity in your prior, according to (1.3). In the face of all these other theories, the posterior loses faith in theory 0 -the curse of dimensionality strikes again.
Regression is a natural problem, hierarchical priors are often used, and the one defined by (1.3) charges every weak star neighbourhood of the parameter space O. Still, inconsistency may result. In high-dimensional problems, little can be taken for granted. 'Rational use of additional information' is not a slogan to be adopted without reflection.
Why inconsistency?
What is the root cause ofthe inconsistency? Suppose f = i,so the data result from coin tossing, and the covariates do not matter. Thus, theory 0 is the truth. The statistician does not know this, however, and high-order theories may be deceptively attractive because they have many parameters.
However, the 'curse of dimensionality' only strikes under some circumstances. When? To make this a little clearer, consider a design of order n, so there are 2" subjects. According FW Diaconis and D. Freedman to theory n, the response of each subject is determined by the toss of a coin, where the probability is uniform on LO, 11. Now one toss of a coin with a uniformly distributed random p is just like one toss of a fair coin -you get heads with probability 4 and tails with probability 4. Thus, theory n competes with theory 0. Indeed, the predictive probability of the data under theory n is 1 nn{data) = , .
22 Let S be the sum of the response variables -the total number of heads. Under theory 0, the predictive probability of the data is n,{data} = const. 2 "I2no {data).
(1.5)
The prior n is a mixture ~~= O~k n k /~~~O~b
The posterior is a similar mixture, the posterior weight on theory k being w k times the predictive probability of the data under n k .
I f f = 4, then, it is the theory weights w k that decide consistency. If w k declines rapidly, for example, w k = 1 / 2~, the weight on theory n compensates for the factor 2"* in (1.5); and the prior is consistent at f -i . On the other hand, if w k declines slowly, for example, w k = l/(k + I )~, the factor 2"i2 dominates, and inconsistency is the result.
The heart of the problem seems to be that a mixture of Bernoulli variables is again Bernoulli. Our heuristic, then, is that consistency obtains when mixing leads outside the basic parametric family. For example, suppose the response variable takes three values, 0, 1 and 2; and, given the covariates E, the response is distributed as the number of heads when an f(E) coin is tossed twice. A mixture of Bin(2, p) variables cannot be Bin(2, p); the heuristic suggests that Bayes estimates will be consistent.
To prove this kind of theorem in any degree of generality, we would need to impose smoothness conditions like those which underlie the usual asymptotics of maximum likelihood estimates, including the Bernstein-von Mises theorem. We would also need integrability conditions of the kind which underlie the usual theory of entropy bounds. The second set of conditions would enable us to localize the problem, and the first set would enable us to make local estimates. Rather than pursue such technical issues here, we prove a theorem for normal response variables -which is difficult enough. Consistency obtains, according to our heuristic, because a mixture of N ( p , 1) variates cannot be N ( p , 1). The theorem is stated in Section 2, and proved in later sections. A second theorem shows that Bayesian regression gets the order of the model right -if the model is of finite order. Inconsistencies arising from flat priors are also discussed, and an extended example is given.
with f i n some class of functions, t, in an interval (say), and E; independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) errors. A prior is assumed for f; a posterior is computed, and the posterior mean is used to estimate J: Typically, the ti are taken as deterministic; our ti are random.
The earliest reference we know is Poincare (1896) . He used a Gaussian prior of the form f(t) -CiXiti for t in [-I, 11 , the X; being independent Gaussian variables with mean 0 and variances tending to 0. He assumed (1.6) with E~ = 0. Invoking the 'method of causes' -the classical phrase for Bayes' theorem -he computed the posterior mean of f (t) given f(t;) for i = I, . . . , n; his ti were deterministic. Poincare's beautiful calculations are equivalent to what we now call the theory of 'reproducing kernel Hilbert spaces'.
The subsequent history of Bayesian regression is traced in Diaconis (1988) and Traub et al. (1988) . There is closely related work on sieves and on model selection; see Geman and Hwang (1982) , Shibata (1981; or Stone (1982) . Hierarchical priors for regression in finite-dimensional settings go back to Lindley and Smith (1972) .
The simplest possible regression model has a constant mean function. That is the location problem: Yi = p +E~, where p is an unknown constant and the errors ~i are i.i.d. Diaconis and Freedman (1988) studied nonparametric priors on p and on the law of the errors; see also Doss (1984; 1985a; 1985b) . Some natural priors lead to inconsistent estimates, while other priors give consistent results. Nonparametric Bayesian regression also connects with the theory of splines (Kimeldorf and Wahba 1970; Kohn and Ansley 1987) ; for a recent survey, see Wahba (1990) . Cox (1993) has an elegant mathematical treatment. He begins with the model (1.6) on [0, 11, say, where f is confined by assumption to a given smoothness class (that is, a Sobolev space). He specifies a Gaussian prior by the Karhunen-Loeve representation,
The X i are i.i.d. IV(0, l), C i a f < x,and the g, are an orthonormal basis in a suitable Hilbert space -a set-up rather similar to Poincare's.
Cox computes the posterior for f given f (t,) + E~ for i = 1, . . . , n, the E~ being i.i.d. N(0, 1).
He shows that in this infinite-dimensional setting, the Bernstein-von Mises theorem does not apply: the posterior distribution (centred at the mean) may be radically different from the frequentist distribution of the Bayes estimates (centred at truth). His set-up differs from ours in several ways (recall that f is the true mean function in the sampling model that governs the data). First, his f is L2 and smooth; our f is only L2. Second, his prior is different; indeed, it is probably orthogonal to ours. Third, his tis are deterministic and equally spaced, rather than random. That all said, an interesting heuristic connection between his results and ours can be made via wavelet theory -as pointed out by a very helpful referee. That discussion continues in Section 11 below. There is a similar connection with the Gaussian white noise model, which is discussed in Brown and Low (1996) and Donoho (1994) . Also see Diaconis and Freedman (1997) .
Literature review on consistency of Bayes estimates
Frequentist properties of Bayes rules have been studied since Laplace (1774) , who showed that in smooth, finite-dimensional problems, the posterior concentrates in a neighbourhood of the maximum likelihood estimates. Modern versions of the result can be found in Bernstein (1934 ), von Mises (1964 , Johnson (1967; 1970) , LeCam (1982) or Ghosh et al. (1982) . These results hold for almost all data sequences. In very simple settings, we obtained bounds that hold for all sequences (Diaconis and Freedman 1990) . Freedman (1963) considered nonparametric Bayes procedures, with a counterexample: there is a prior supported on all of the parameter space, whose posterior converges almost surely to the wrong answer. That paper introduced the Dirichlet and tail-free priors, and showed them to be consistent. For reviews, see Ferguson (1974) or Diaconis and Freedman (1988) . Also see Schwartz (1965) . LeCam (1953) proved a version of what has come to be known as the Bernstein-von Mises theorem; see also LeCam and Yang (1990) . LeCam's theorems were almost sure results, with respect to the true underlying measure that had generated the data; and he proved convergence in total variation norm. Previous authors had demonstrated only convergence of distribution functions, in probability. Furthermore, LeCam seems to have been the first to condition on all the data, not just summary statistics (such as the mean). For more discussion, see Pollard et al. (1997) .
Efforts are now under way to develop a unified theory for consistency of Bayes estimates in the infinite-dimensional case: see Bunke and Milhaud (1994) , Ghosal et al. (1997) , Shen (1996) and Barron et al. (1997) . So far, the results are somewhat fragmentary; we do not think our examples are covered by such theories.
The formal set-up
The set-up is virtually identical to that for the binary case, except that the response variables are normal; details are repeated for ease of reference. The covariates 6 are a sequence of 0s and Is, sequence space is given the product topology, and the parameter space O is the set of LZ functions f from sequence space to (-m, m) . The L2 topology is installed on O , relative to coin-tossing measure A" in sequence space C,. A basic neighbourhood o f f E O is the '6-ball' Consider a prior n on O, with posterior k,. Then n is consistent for f provided 76,{NCf, 6)) 41 almost surely, for all positive 6.
The prior 761, is supported on the class of hnctions f such that f(x) depend only on the first k coordinates in x = (XI,x2, . . .). Thus, nk is determined by specifying the joint distribution of the 2k possible values for f: These are independent N(0, 1) variables; we refer to nk as 'standard normal'. We put prior weight wk on k, so our prior is of the Turn now to the data, which are 'balanced' in the sense of Diaconis and Freedman (1993) . At stage n, there are 2" subjects, indexed by t. Each has a response variable Y(t) and a covariate sequence t(t). The first n bits of the covariate sequences cover all possible patterns of length n; each pattern appears once and only once. The remaining bits from n t 1 onwards are generated by coin tossing. Given the covariates, response variables are independent normals, with variance 1. The conditional mean response of subject t depends only on the covariate string for that subject, through the function f:
Given the covariates, the response variables are independent across subjects, normally distributed, with common variance 1 and E{ Y(
This completes the set-up. The main theorems can now be stated.
Theorem 2.1. Suppose the design is balanced, and normal in the sense of (2.3). Suppose the prior ,z is hierarchical in the sense of (2.2), and the nk are standard normal. Then n is coi~sistent for all f E L2.
Let Ok be the class of functions f which depend only on the first k bits of the argument x; these increase with k. Recall that 5nis the posterior given the data at stage n.
Theorem 2.2. Suppose the design is balanced, and normal in the sense of (2.3). Suppose the
prior n is hierarchical, and the nk are standard normal. If f E Ok and wk >O, then 5n{@k) -+ 1 almost surely as n -+ m.
Theorem 2.1 demonstrates consistency, while Theorem 2.2 says that the Bayesian gets the order of a finite model right, at least if there is positive prior mass on the right order. This is a bit surprising, because many selection algorithms estimate models that are too complex; for instance, see Breiman and Freedman (1983) .
We turn now to improper priors; n k is 'flat' if the joint distribution of (8,: s E Ck) is Lebesgue measure on 2k-dimensional Euclidean space. With flat priors, consistency will obtain only if the weights wk decay at a very rapid rate, as in (2.4a); condition (2.4b), satisfied if w~ = l/k2 or wk = 1/2k or wk = Ilk!, ensures inconsistency: Theorem 2.3 will be proved in Section 8 and Section 9 gives an example. Until then, the n k will be normal. Flat priors present definitional problems, to be discussed in Section 10.
Proofs: the preliminaries
We will compute the predictive probability density of the data, under theory k; then the posterior. Where possible, we follow the notation and arguments in Diaconis and Freedman (1993) . To review briefly, let C k be the set of strings of 0s and 1s of length k. There are 2k strings s E C k .Let C , be the set of infinite sequences of 0s and Is, in the product topology and product o-field. Let 1" be coin-tossing measure on C,. The parameter space O consists of all L2 functions from C , to (-m, m) ; functions that are equal almost everywhere are identified. We endow O with the L2 metric and the Bore1 a-field generated by the balls (2.1). Of course, O is complete separable metric. As previously defined,
depends only on the first k coordinates of x E C,. (3.la)
The probability n k on O concentrates on O k and makes 19, independent and N(0, 1 ) as s varies over Ck.
All random variables are defined on some probability triple (St,.P,
, where f At stage n, we have 2" independent subjects indexed by t E C,, with response variables Y ( t ) and covariate strings &t), forming a balanced design of order n. In particular, (2.3) holds. Furthermore, E,(t) = ti for 1 S i S n; for i > n the variables Ei(t) are independent, each being 0 or 1 with probability 4:these are the 'balance' conditions. Here, Ei(t) is the ith bit in the covariate sequence for subject t. To ease the notation, we sometimes write Y, for Y ( t ) or E, for &t).
As usual, n k can be extended to a probability on O X Q, by the formula In this formula, A is a measurable subset of O and B is a measurable subset of Q; f -+ P f { B ) is measurable because is continuous for bounded continuous functions g,.
Fix k and n. The response variables Y,: t E C, have a joint probability density -the predictive probability density -with respect to nk. This density will be denoted pk,, and viewed as a function of 2" real variables Y,: t E C,.
Lemma 3.1. For a balanced normal design of order n and the standard normal prior nk, the predictive probability density pk, may be computed as follows:
In these formulae, bkn= 2k(n -k)ilog2; c*, = 2~;lOg(1 + A);
and t extends s).
Each V, is a 2n-k-tuple of pairs of random variables. Recall 0, from (3.1). Recall that a k was extended to O X S2 by (3.2).
Relative to nk, as s ranges over Ck, the pairs (V,, 8,) are i.i.d. Let ?ch be the posterior distribution of computed relative to n k , given the data from a balanced normal design of order n. Lemma 3.2 computes this posterior for k < n; and Lemma 3.3 does the job for k > n. Clearly, ?ckn concentrates on O k , as defined in (3.1).
As a notational principle, the functions defined in (3.4) will be denoted by capital letters, when evaluated at { Y , ) rather than { y , ) . The following definitions will be used throughout. 
In other terms, T h ( x ) is obtained by averaging the
This function depends, of course, on w ; however, for each
Recall 8, from (3.1) and dk, from (3.4). given data from a balanced normal design of order n, the parameters 8, are conditionally independent as s ranges over Ck, and 8, is normal:
ProoJ In view of ( 3 3 , only the case k = 0 needs to be argued, and this is routine. 
Estimating the posteriors kkn
The idea of the proof is simple, although details are quite tedious. We estimate the predictive probabilities Rh, and show that the posterior concentrates on ks which are considerably smaller than n. In that range, the posteriors ick, concentrate near their mean functions.
We turn now to rigour. Recall (3.4) and Definition 3.1. In particular, for k < n and s E C k , is the average of Yt over t such that t is an extension of s. And Yknhas domain C, X Q. For t E C,, let a , be real. As is easily verified.
is monotone non-decreasing in 1, for (I < k s n.
k rECi
The following are immediate; calculations are relative to P f .
As t ranges over C,, the pairs (Y,, 6,)are independent.
(4.2a)
is independent of (6,: t E C,).
(4.2~) These are deterministic functions on Ck and C, , respectively; gk(x) is well defined for all x, even though g may only be defined almost everywhere. By the usual martingale theorems, gk --g almost everywhere and in L2 as k --m, relative to I.". The next step is to show that fk, can be well approximated by fk. We begin with a version of the strong law. Recall that Pf makes the 6, independent as t ranges over C,.
Furthermore, if t E C,, then [i(t)
= ti for 1 C i S n; for i > n the 6i(t) are independent, each taking the values 0 or 1 with probability i. The 6, are independent but not identically distributed. Indeed,
The Pf-law of (, is just the A"-law of x, given that
s n ) . (4.6)

Theorem 4.1. Suppose h is a measurable function on C,. I f h is L1 with respect to Ax, then
as n --m, with Pf-probability 1.
ProoJ This is proved by a standard truncation argument, as in Feller (1968, p. 247) . In more detail, let h' = h provided I hl C 2", else let h' = 0; the dependence on n is not shown. We claim that Pf-almost surely, for all sufficiently large n, for all t E C,, hr((,) = h(6,). (4.7) Indeed the Pf-probability of the complementary event is at most iS{lh(x)l> 2"/ x , --t, for I < i n )
where the first equality holds by (4.6). Now
The Borel-Cantelli lemma completes the proof of (4.7).
For t E C,, let mt = 2" J (,,hfa " , where ( t ) is the set of x E C" with .u, = t , for 1 i s n. By 
(~)~~" ( d x ) .
We now estimate B, as follows:
~( x )~A " (dx) l h (~) I s 2~)
The Borel-Cantelli lemma completes the proof of (4.9). Relations (4.7)-(4.9) prove the theorem.
Remark. Let W , = { t , : t E C,), a set of 2" random variables. The joint distribution of W,, as n varies. does not matter in Theorem 4.1.
We return to the idea of approximating fk, by fk; on the former, see Definition 4.1; the latter is defined in (4.4).
Proposition 4.3. For Pf-almost all w, as n + x,
Proo$ Use (4.1) with a , = Y, -f,(t), to see the maximum is attained for k = n. Write 11. 11
for the L2 norm relative to A". Fix 6 >0. Using ( 4 3 , choose j so large that 11 f -gll < 6 , where g = f , depends only on the first j bits of x. We claim that -g,,(x, w ) = g,(x) for all x E C, and all w E R, provided n >j. where e, = 0 or 1 depending on w. However, g(x) = f,(x) only depends on the first j bits of .r, by (4.4). So, the left-hand side of (4.10) boils down to J;(..cl, . . . , x,). For future reference, -g,,(x, w) = ,f,(x) for all x E C, and all w E S2, provided n >j.
(4.11)
The right-hand side of (4.10) is E2.{gjxl, . . . ,x,), the expectation being taken relative to AX, by definition (4.4). However. g = f, only depends on xi, . . . , x,. So, the right-hand side of (4.10) is also f,(xl, . . . ,x,). This completes the proof of (4.10).
For all w and all n >j,
The middle term on the right-hand side of (4.12) vanishes, by (4.10). The last term may be recognized as 11 f,(.) -fn(.)l/, whose limit as n + x is less than 6. by construction. The Corollary 4.3. Fix 6 >0. There is a B = B(6) < c c so large that for Pf-alnzost all w, for all suficiently large n, for all k c n -B, ?ih{N(fk, 6)) > 1 -6; the 6-ball N was dejned in
This is immediate from Lemma 4.1 and Corollary 4.2b, by the triangle inequality. Corollary 4.3 completes our discussion of the posteriors 5k,, and we turn to the posterior theory weights wkn.
Estimating the theory weights wkn
As we will show, the posterior theory weights wh tend to concentrate on theories k with k < n -B. The wkn are computed from the predictive probability densities RRn;see (3.6 ).
The Rk, in turn are driven by the quadratic Qkn;see (3.4). According to our notation, Rh is just pkn, with { Y t ) in place of { y , ) ; likewise for Qkn and qkn. The first lemma is useful, if superficial. If f is jinitaiy, that is, f = fk for some k, then weight concentrates on the minimal k with f = fk and wlk > 0; that case will be handled in the next section. Otherwise, the posterior weight on any particular k tends to 0.
We are now ready to prove Theorem 2.1,under the side condition f = f, for no j, This completes the proof of Theorem 2.1 under the side condition (5.3).Lemma (3.10)in Diaconis and Freedman (1993) can be used to obtain bounds.
Finitary f
Suppose f = fkfor some k; let ko be the least such k. We must prove Theorems 2.1 and 2.2. The proof of Proposition 6.1 is deferred. Only the case k l = 0 needs to be argued: we can assume that, for some constant c, The next lemma is elementary; see also (5.17) in Diaconis and Freedman (1993) . The notation is laid out in (3.4).
Lemma 6.1.
Recall Zk, from (6.3).
Lemma 6.2. Fix E > 0. Let B = 218. Almost surely, for all sujiciently large n, Zkn< ~2~( n k ) for all k a n -B.
and the sum in (6.5) is finite.
Consider next the k with k -' n'. Now 2k S d o g 2 ; and 2,(n -k ) 3 n, the value at k = 0, by Lemma 6.l(b) . Let n* be the greatest integer with n* S dog2. We have
by Chebyschev's inequality: ~ar{~:,} = 2n*, and E{x:,) = n* = o(n). Then
The Borel-Cantelli lemma completes the proof.
The next result is easily proved using Chebyshev's inequality; of course, much better estimates are available. 
ProoJ:
We evaluate log RJn-log R1, by Lemma 3.1, as
b~n -b j n + c~~-c j , + Q j~-Q l~< A + B + C + D ,
where el, was estimated by Lemma 6.l(c), -cj, < 0 was dropped and Q was evaluated by (6.2). Now B can be dropped; indeed B < 0 by Lemma 6.l(a). In C, 1 -din = 1/(2"-' + 1 ) for i = 1 or j. In D, -;dl,S1, < 0 can be dropped.
The upper bound becomes
The two terms involving S , can be bounded above using Corollary 6.1; the last term can be l?K Diaconis and D. Freedman bouned above, using Lemma 6.2, to get (eb,,)/(log2) <2eb,,. We have an upper bound for log R,, -log R] ,of
by Lemma 6.1(b). Now use (3.4b) to get an upper bound of the form Proposition 6.1 is an immediate consequence.
Possible generalizations
According to our priors J G~,the 2k possible values 8, for f were independent N(0, 1) variables. Of course, N(,u, 0 2 ) would suffice. Furthermore, the problem can be broken down and handled separately on each of the 2"ieces in Ck. In other words, according to nj, the mean and variance of 8, can depend on s l , . . . , sk, provided j > k. Presumably, some sort of limiting argument is feasible, so that moderately general prior Ineans and variances can be accommodated. Other possible generalizations are discussed in Diaconis and Freedman (1995) . For example, the 8, might taken as independent, with densities subject to uniform boundedness and smoothness conditions, as well as decay rates at hcc. Another promising class of priors nk is given by Ylvisaker (1987) ; these have some built-in smoothness.
Flat priors
Recall that J Tĩs 'flat' if the joint distribution of (8,: s E Cx) is Lebesgue measure on 2k-dimensional Euclidean space. We prove Theorem 2.3 by showing how to modify previous arguments. The predictive density, evaluated at the data, may be computed for k S n as For k > n, there is a definitional problem, since Rk, must be infinite on sets of positive Lebesgue measure. For instance, take k = 0 and n = 1; suppose the first bit in x is 0. There are two parameters, e0 and el, both subject to Lebesgue measure; the first is observed, the second unobserved. The 'preditive measure' or 'marginal measure' of { Y E A ) is Since this predictive measure assigns infinite mass to any set of positive Lebesgue measure, the usual disintegrations (and definitions of conditional measures) do not make much sense. See Section 10 below.
The simplest way around this definitional issue is to treat each design as a separate inference problem with its own prior. (Recall that the 'objective' part of the model does not require any particular specification of joint distributions across n.) At stage n, the prior puts weight wlh on theory k < n, and weight 0 on theory k > n. For theory n, we can keep the weight at w,, or set it to CT=,wk; the latter seems to make the algebra a little easier. Thus, our convention is the following:
With flat priors, at stage n, the prior weight on theory k < n remains wk; the prior weight on theory k > n is set to 0; the prior weight on theory n is set to be CT=, wk. (8.3)
We could also allow the Bayesian to ignore unobserved parameters when calculating predictive distributions and posteriors: the posterior distribution of an unobserved parameter stays flat. Arguments and results are essentially unchanged. Related papers that use improper priors include Kohn and Ansley (1987) and Wahba (1990) . We now estimate Q h ; bounds are organized to prove the inconsistency result, but are modified later to make the consistency arguments. Remark. k --+ uk, is convex, monotone decreasing for k = 0, 1, . . . , n -6, and monotone increasing for k = n -6 , . . . , n -1, n. The total posterior weight on theories k with k 2 n is by (8.4) at least exp{ -i2"(log 2ne -36)) Rnn(w).
Comparing the last two expressions completes the proof.
If k 2 n -4, there are at most 24 observations per parameter, so the posterior remains diffuse, and there is inconsistency. ) make this precise, and complete the proof of the inconsistency assertion in Theorem 2.3. Clearly, if k a n, ?ikn is a proper probability measure, making (6,: s E C k ) independent N(Y,,1/2n-k).
(8.5)
The next result applies a bit more generally. To state it, let Pr be a joint distribution for (0,: s E C k ) , making them independent N(p,, a 2 ) ;the p, may be any real numbers. We can view Pr as a probability distribution on h E LZ, as follows: Pr concentrates on O k , the set of h that depend only on the first k bits of x; and the Pr law of {~( s x~+~x~+. . .): s E C k ) is just the Pr law of (8,: s E C k ) . If g E L2, the 6-ball N ( g , 6 ) around g was defined in (2.1).
Lemma 8.3. Pr {hT (g, 6 ) ) is maximized when g is piecewise constant, being p, on the x that extend s.
Proof:
The leading special case is k = 0 and a 2 = 1. Let U be N ( p , 1) . Then Of course, is minimized when g r c, and then is stochastically smallest when c = E(U).
Lemma 8.4. Fix 6 > 0 with d2 < 1 / 2~+ ' . I f n -B C k 6 n, the ?ckn-mass of any 6-ball tends to 0 as n -+ x.
Proof: Let E be x2 with 2k degrees of freedom. By (8.4) and (8.5) , the posterior mass in question is bounded above by P{E <d22"}< P{E < 2 k / 2 ) , because d22" <2k/2. Then use Lemma 4.2.
In particular, theories in the range [ n -4, n] cannot have posteriors concentrated near the true f -or anywhere else, for that matter. This completes the proof of inconsistency, and we now sketch the argument for consistency. Use condition (2.4a) to choose 6 > 0 so that, for all sufficiently large n, Choose k so large that wk > 0 and S f : > f' -612,for the new 6. Recall (8.3). We claim that theory n is negligible a posteriori, relative to theory k.
(8.12) Indeed Q,, was bounded in Lemma 8.1. So, the total posterior weight on theory n is bounded above by Compare (8.13) with (8.10) -based on the new 6 -to prove (8.12). The factor of 32 is quite generous here, but will be needed below.
With the same 6 and k, we claim that, for j = 1, 2, 3, 4, theory n -j is negligible a posteriori, relative to theory k. (8.14)
Indeed,
The posterior weight on theory n -j is bounded above by 
An example
This section gives an example with flat priors and rapidly decreasing theory weights; the idea is to show that posterior mass can accumulate on theories n or n -1, whatever the time f may be. Suppose +ilk = 0 for odd k; while ~t , k = exp { -~2 " for even k, where C is a positive constant. Clearly, lim-1 log C a,* -C as even n -+ cc 2, -2C as odd n + x.
(rn
If C > a" = ;log 2ne, there is consistency. If 0 < C < ao, inconsistency obtains. More interesting is this. Suppose (9.la) (9.1b)
We claim that:
as odd n + m, posterior mass concentrates on theory n -1; (9.2a) as even n + x, posterior mass concentrates on theory n.
(9.2b) Only (9.2a) will be argued. Consider the odd n. Theories k C n -5 are negligible, by Corollary 8.2; theories n -2 and n -4 have prior mass 0. At stage n, by convention (8.3), theory n is given prior mass w,-L~+ w , -L+ . . . ; indeed, w, = w,+2 = . . . = 0. Thus, only theories n -3, n -1, and n are in contention. The posterior theory weights can be computed from (3.6) and (8.1)-(8.2), with Lemma 8.1 to estimate their magnitudes.
Let K, = A,, + 42" Sf 2. For any 6 > 0, almost surely, for all sufficiently large odd n:
the posterior weight on theory n -3 is bounded above by exp {K,
where C3 = (-C + a0 -;log 2)12~;
(9.3a)
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the posterior weight on theory n -1 is bounded below by exp {K, +2"(C1 -d)), where C1 = (-C +a0 -;log 2)/2; (9.3b) the posterior weight on theory n is bounded above by 2exp {K, +2"(D + a)], where D = -2C +ao.
( 9 . 3~)
The factor of 2 in ( 9 . 3~) results from the estimate which holds because e-"0 <ecC0/2 when Co>ilog 2. It remains only to check that C1 > D and CI > C3, which follow from (9. la) and (9. lb), respectively.
A definitional issue with flat priors
You are about to observe independent normal variables X and Y Both have variance 1. Theory 1 is that X and Y have the same mean, 8; there is a flat prior on 8. Theory 2 is that X has mean 8 and Y has mean v ; there is a flat prior on the pair (8, v) . To adjudicate between the two theories, you put prior mass 0.5 on each, observe (X, Y), and compute the posterior.
But now suppose Y is not observed. Theory 2 has an infinite marginal 'density' for X,surely, that cannot tip the balance for theory 2. In this section, we review the calculus, and suggest a 'partial Bayes rule' convention: basically, the idea is to ignore Y and the prior on its parameter. That makes theories 1 and 2 agree on the observables, as seems sensible: X is N(8, 1) and 8 is uniform. Of course, the 'predictive' or 'marginal' law of (X, Y) relative to u is ,I2.Given X and Zthe posterior law of 8, q1 is that of two independent N(X, 1) and N(Y, 1) variables. Indeed, let Q,ry{d8, dq~} be the proposed conditional. By Fubini's theorem, where po is the marginal law of X and Z namely, i2. The 'disintegration' (10.2) makes rigorous the idea of the posterior. That much is staightfonvard. Now suppose that Y is not observed. Suddenly, there is a definitional crisis: the marginal law of X assigns infinite mass to any set of positive Lebesgue measure. Thus, it seems impossible to define the posterior distribution of 0, q 1 given X by means of the usual disintegration formulas. For related calculations, see Eaton (1 992).
There is a natural convention to make:
(a) the predictive law of X is uniform; and (b) the posterior law of 0, I)given X i s this: 0 is N(X,l), I)is uniform, and the two are independent.
With these conventions, the inconsistency results of Sections 8 and 9 go through; only minor changes are needed in the arguments. Eliminating the weights on complex theories (k of order n or larger) tends to speed up the rate of convergence for proper priors; eliminating the prior mass beyond n -5 does wonders even for flat-prior Bayesians. Thus, the convention followed in Section 8 seems more favourable to the Bayesians than the convention proposed here; even so, inconsistency is the result.
Bayesian regression, splines and wavelets
This section sketches a heuristic connection between our results and those in Cox (1993) , via wavelet theory. Let {fJk: k = 1, 2, . . . , 2') index the Haar wavelet functions of level j. Our covariates takes values in coin-tossing space, which is, of course, isomorphic to the unit interval. Thus, our prior can in principle be viewed as the distribution of Each Xjk is a mixture of normal variates with mean 0, and the Xjk are uncorrelated. We may consider replacing Xjk by Zjk, where the ZJk are independent, normal, and var(Zjk) = var(Xjk); the latter depends on j not k. Now defines a prior of the kind studied by Cox. This connection is interesting, but somewhat formal -because the law of {ZJk) is quite different from the law of {XJk). In particular, we do not see how to derive our results from his -or his from ours. Nor do we see how do derive consistency and inconsistency results of the kind we have previously demonstrated from wavelet theory. Cox's main result shows that, in his set-up, Bayesian confidence sets do not have good frequentist coverage probability, but that does not establish inconsistency in our sense, because the distance from the posterior mean to the true parameter is not bounded from below. Likewise, his estimates do not imply consistency, at least directly. However, calculations like those in his paper should establish consistency, at least in his l 2 set-up. For more discussion, see Diaconis and Freedman (1 997) .
